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Abstract 
The article addresses the interface between law and the morality of civil society. It starts with a review of the 
discourse between the utilitarian approach to rationality and perspectives which include normative action. It 
subsequently explores the dynamics of compliance and non-compliance among a group of Norwegian fishermen. 
The choice of compliance was guided by an informally-enforced set of moral norms, which largely dissolved the 
connection between expected benefit and the likeliness of infractions. This moral system defined instances in 
which violations could take place without being met with informal sanctions, and thus also allowed for strategic 
action to some extent. The article illustrates how civil society enforces the law according to moral rather than 
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State regulation of fish harvesting activities has expanded over the past twenty 
years. As a result, the issue of enforcement and compliance has been the object of 
increasing attention. In the academic literature as well as in the public debate, the 
problem of violations of fisheries law is often hypothesised to be rooted in an absence 
of moral restraints and in inefficient formal enforcement. However, the issue has 
been insufficiently explored empirically. This article addresses the interface between 
the laws of the state and the morality of civil society. It attempts to explore if and 
how the morality of a specific collectivity of fishermen influences choices regarding 
compliance, and how formal regulations are informally enforced. The data are based 
on an ethnographic fieldwork in a Norwegian fishing community in 1997, and 
consist of informal and semi-structured interviews as well as observations. The study 
included approximately 25 informants, but it emerges as a study of one social 
network, as it focuses on the relations between these individuals. The informants 
constituted the most active part of Uerhavn's fisheries milieu. The primary data upon 
which the article is based are summarised as descriptive text in this article. However, 
I will also use a few direct quotes as examples and illustrations.  
 
Theoretical Background 
The question regarding the role of norms will be addressed at two levels. First, 
there is the extent to which action in a specific collectivity of fishermen is influenced 
by moral considerations. In its most simple and puristic form, this question relates to 
the traditional distinction between the socialised actor and the atomized, rational, 
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utility maximising, self-interested individual in social theory. Secondly, there are the 
more specific questions as to which norms apply and how they regulate behaviour. 
Whereas the first question will be addressed through an evaluation of the relevance 
of well established theoretical perspectives, elaboration on the latter will have more 
of a “grounded theory” approach in Glaser and Strauss’ terms (1967). 
The topic of this article is thus linked to a sociological discourse which is as old 
as it is tenacious. Parsons’s ([1937] 1968) general attack on the “utilitarian system of 
social theory” has a number of more empirically specific derivatives, several of 
which are potentially relevant to the topic of this article. As we are concerned with 
fishing as an economic activity, we face the debate between neoclassical economics 
and economic sociology (Swedberg & Granovetter 1992). As we are concerned with 
management of a common property resource, we face the debate between the 
Tragedy of the Commons school, represented by e.g. Garret Hardin (1968) and H. 
Scott Gordon (1954), and its critics who argue that the narrow rational choice 
approach of this school of thought overlooks people’s institution-building capacities 
(Acheson 1975; Berkes 1983; Berkes & Farvar 1989; McCay & Acheson 1987; Ostrom 
1987; Ostrom 1990). The analytic focus of this article is compliance with the law, and 
we find a derivative of the discourse also in this field. 
Becker’s model of crime and deterrence applies neo-classical economics to the 
field of criminal behaviour. A choice concerning compliance is seen as the outcome of 
the actor’s expected net gain from breaking the law, the risk of detection, prosecution 
and conviction, and the severity of punishment (Becker 1968). As state regulation of 
fish harvesting expanded in the 1980s, Becker’s model was combined with bio-
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economic models in order to adapt this perspective to the field of fisheries (Sutinen & 
Andersen 1985; Anderson & Lee 1986). Some years later, these models were also 
applied in a few empirical studies on the issue. The studies were based on survey 
data and had neo-classical economics as their sole perspective (Sutinen & Gauvin 
1989; Blewett et al. 1987; Furlong 1991). These studies have generally shown some 
degree of correlation which is consistent with theoretical predictions. However, the 
explanatory power of this perspective has not proved to be very strong. 
Several years before compliance with law became an issue in fisheries research, a 
number of general surveys on people’s compliance with the law were carried out 
(Friedland et al. 1973; Silberman 1976; Meier & Johnson 1977; Grasmick & Green 
1980; Paternoster et al. 1983; Tyler 1990). These studies were consistent in their 
conclusions that social factors such as morality, peer involvement and threat of social 
disapproval were the main factors influencing choices in terms of compliance with 
the law. The effect of factors connected with legal punishment proved to be 
comparatively weak.  
On this background, the dominant position of neo-classical economics in studies 
of compliance in fisheries may seem surprising. On the other hand, fisheries is an 
economic activity, and it can be argued that this makes it reasonable to believe that 
cost-benefit calculation is likely to be more relevant here. However, the findings of 
the general research on compliance have been confirmed by several studies on 
business crime. Morality and informal social control has emerged as more important 
than formal sanctions also in these studies (Paternoster & Simpson 1996).  
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In the 1990s, numerous authors have emphasised the need to take a broader 
approach to the issue of compliance in fisheries, and particular emphasis has been 
placed on the normative aspect (Jentoft 1989; Sutinen et al. 1990; Sagdahl 1992; 
Jennings 1994a; Jennings 1994b; Sutinen 1994; Spagnolo 1994; Hønneland 1995). A 
few empirical studies which have included normative aspects have been carried out 
in recent years. In a statistical survey on fisheries in the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, Kuperan et al. (1997) found that personal moral development and 
compliance among peers, as well as the probability of detection and conviction, 
affected violation rates. A study of compliance in the Barents Sea offshore fisheries 
suggested that the Coast Guard ensured a relatively high level of compliance due to 
successful use of discursive measures and the fact that fishermen tend to have 
positive attitudes towards the Coast Guard (Hønneland 1998; Hønneland 1999). 
Nielsen and Mathiesen (2000) used questionnaires and semi-structured interviews in 
a study of compliance in Danish fisheries. They concluded that most fishermen had 
an opportunistic approach to compliance, but that normative aspects played a part. 
The research on compliance in fisheries has almost exclusively focused on the 
extent to which different factors influence fishermen’s choices. In-depth studies of 
how and under what conditions the different factors affect their choices are lacking. 
Theoretical developments within this particular field have also been scarce. We 
consequently lack knowledge on the actual dynamics of compliance in fisheries. This 
article is an attempt to take a step in the direction of remedying this lack. 
The extreme versions of rational choice theory that have been addressed above 
disregard norms altogether. Boudon (1998) has argued that this narrow rational 
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choice approach, which he labels the “utilitarian version of rationality”, should be 
replaced by the “Cognitivist Model” which includes false beliefs and normative 
considerations, provided that they are founded on strong reasons. A theory of 
normative action does thus not imply any rejection of rationality and agency. Neither 
does a theory of normative action have to imply that actions are determined by norms, 
i.e. an “oversocialised conception of man” (Wrong 1961). The two models of agency 
addressed above are only mutually exclusive in their most extreme and reductionist 
forms. 
 
Regulation and Compliance among Uerhavn’s Fishermen 
The Setting 
“Uerhavn”1 is a fishing community of approximately 390 inhabitants 
constituting 150 households. It is located on the outer tip of a headland on the north-
western coast of Norway. The community has 60 registered fishermen, 36 of whom 
are registered as full-time fishermen. Fishing and fish processing are by far the most 
important industries in this community. Uerhavn has 17 vessels participating in 
fishing, eleven of which can be classified as professionally active. All vessels are 
decked. None of the vessels are longer than 25 meters and only three are longer than 
13 meters. The larger vessels operate a combination of gill nets and purse seines, 
while the smaller boats use automatic jiggers2, sometimes in combination with 
                                                 
1 “Uerhavn” is a pseudonym. Names of informants are also fictional. 
2 The automatic jigging machine is a mechanical device which imitates the traditional handline jigging. This gear 
consists of a line with a series of artificially-baited hooks and a sinker attached to it. The line runs from the collecting 
drum on the machine mounted on board the boat, over the boat side along a jib and into the sea.  The machine 
automatically pulls the line approximately a fathom and lets it back down until a certain quantity of fish is hooked, 
and it subsequently hauls the line automatically. 
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gillnets. A decked fishing vessel under 13 meters is generally referred to as a sjark. 
Most of Uerhavn’s sjarks are one-man operations, but those who mainly use gillnets 
normally have crews of two or three. The purse seiner/gill netters have crews of 
three to seven people. The sjarks, which usually operate on a day-trip basis, fish 
groundfish exclusively. The main species are saithe, cod and redfish. When fishing 
out of their domestic harbour, saithe is normally the target species while redfish is 
caught as by-catch. Most of the professionally active sjarks go north in the winter and 
spring to participate in the Lofoten cod fishery. Some also participate in the cod 
fisheries in Finnmark after that. The larger boats participate in purse seine fishery for 
herring and mackerel, in addition to gill net fishery for cod, and gill net and purse 
seine fishery for saithe.  
Uerhavn has a local fish processing plant, but four plants are possible places for 
delivery within an hour’s boat trip from the local fishing grounds, and two more 
within two hours’ boat trip. 
Uerhavn is a fishing community in decline. During the 1960s, the community 
had a fleet of twelve 15 to 22 meter purse seiners which altogether employed 
approximately a hundred people. Today the community experiences a drain of 
young people, as employment opportunities in the Uerhavn area are scarce for those 
returning home after higher education. The population has dropped with 20% over 
the past fifteen years. The average age of an Uerhavn full-time fisherman is 43, and 
the fishermen report having serious difficulties with recruitment. Some express 
worry that the knowledge of fishing will die with their generation. 
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 The social networks among Uerhavn’s fishermen are characterised by 
Granovetter’s term (1973) “strong ties”, in the sense that most of them socialise on a 
daily basis. The harbour is located at the centre of the community and work-related 
activities are carried out alongside with other community life. The social 
transparency is high and news potentially spread quickly. A fisherman’s professional 
behaviour and qualities affect his general standing in the community as a matter of 
course. There is no clear distinction between work and leisure, colleagues and 
neighbours or kin. In order to understand the efficiency of the informal social control 
described later, this social transparency must be kept in mind. A fisherman is not 
expected to keep too much to himself in the long run, and in mutual care there is an 
element of mutual surveillance. Furthermore, the intimacy of this social network 
makes the possibility of social degradation or exclusion appear as threatening. A 
fisherman’s identity is strongly linked to the adequate membership of this 
collectivity, and there are few alternative collectivities to join in the case of exclusion 
or degradation. This sense of belonging implies that the moral standards of the 
community tend to have significant regulatory force, also for people who may not 
have internalised them. 
Incentives for Non-Compliance 
My fieldwork was carried out during a season when many of the fishermen 
depended on saithe. This fishery was regulated by a total allowable catch3 (TAC) 
which was distributed between different groups of vessels, categorised according to 
size. These group quotas were also divided between different seasons of the year. 
                                                 
3 Total allowable catch is the total amount allowed to be harvested from a certain fish stock. 
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Each boat was allowed to catch a limited amount in that year, but no share of the TAC 
was guaranteed, and in effect this was a competitive fishery.4 This system resulted in 
several temporary closures of the saithe fishery for certain groups of vessels in 1997. 
More than half of Uerhavn’s professionally active vessels were affected by these 
closures. During these closed periods, a certain amount of by-catch of saithe was 
allowed when fishing for other species. However, in the Uerhavn area, fishing for 
other groundfish was extremely difficult without getting illegal amounts of by-catch. 
The fishermen who depended on groundfish thus had to stay at the wharf unless 
they wanted to risk getting illegal catch. The Norwegian government is authorised to 
confiscate the value of illegal catch. Although this is an administrative measure 
aimed at removing the incentive for landing illegal catch, and has no status as a legal 
sanction or punishment, it can inflict significant economic loss on the fisherman.  
At delivery, the buyer and the fisherman are required by law to fill in and sign a 
purchase slip, which shall contain correct information on the amount and species 
landed. Purchase slip information is subsequently sent to the management 
authorities, and is a vital part of the Norwegian quota monitoring system. 
Falsification of purchase slip information is illegal, prosecuted by the court system, 
and one of the most commonly-reported violations in the Norwegian fisheries 
enforcement system. 
In sum, Uerhavn fishermen could have a significant economic incentive to 
conceal catch information during the saithe closures. The fishermen also knew of a 
                                                 
4 Such a system of maximum quotas is combined with competitiveness through a certain level of “over-regulation”, 
which means that the sum of the maximum quotas exceeds the TAC. The fishermen consequently risk that the 
fishery is closed before they manage to catch their quota. 
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fish buyer within range who sometimes was willing to falsify purchase slip 
information. Such falsification can also be in the interest of the buyer. 
Although dockside inspections did occur, Uerhavn fishermen perceived the risk 
of being detected by enforcement authorities as being minor.  
Morality and Sanctions 
Uerhavn’s fishermen most often complied with government regulations, 
including the closure on saithe, despite economic incentives for non-compliance and 
the low risk of being detected by enforcement authorities. During the interviews, the 
fishermen were asked about their personal reasons for compliance, and the answers 
revealed that the level of formal enforcement in this area provided little incentive to 
comply with regulations. None of the informants gave formal enforcement as their 
primary reason for compliance or for keeping violations secret.  
The fishermen’s reasons for compliance focused on the risk of being the object of 
“talk” in the community and on their own moral convictions. It can be argued that 
these must be considered as two aspects of the same cause – namely the moral 
standards of the collectivity. Individual moral convictions in Uerhavn reflected the 
collective morality expressed in public negotiations and gossip. 
The predominance of data emphasising the role of informally enforced morality 
does not necessarily suggest that the general causal connection between formal 
enforcement and compliance is weak, as these data were generated in a situation 
with a modest level of formal enforcement and a high level of social transparency. 
However, this setting provided a good opportunity to study the nature and effect of 
informal compliance mechanisms. The relatively high level of compliance and the 
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fishermen's reasons for this law abidingness indeed suggested that such mechanisms 
played an important part. 
When the closure of the saithe fisheries was announced, several of the affected 
crews were clearly expected to stay ashore, which they did. What puzzled me in the 
beginning, was that a few fishermen continued fishing, and were seemingly allowed 
to do so without becoming objects of back-biting or other sanctions, despite the 
common understanding that they concealed illegal amounts of by-catch by 
falsification of purchase slips. I consequently tried to explore the foundation for this 
differentiated treatment and behaviour. This led me to a set of moral distinctions 
which largely governs the dynamics of compliance in Uerhavn. Observational data 
on the negotiations among the fishermen, as well as interview data, showed that 
their considerations concerning compliance included three basic moral norms. 
I found that an informally-enforced moral obligation to obey the law was the 
single most important factor explaining compliance among Uerhavn’s fishermen. 
Some fishermen expressed that they felt morally uncomfortable when breaking the 
law, while others expressed fear of the gossip which could follow a law-violation. 
Gossip generally consisted of rumours that someone did “something illegal”. The 
obligation to obey the law was believed to be valid regardless of how the regulations 
were otherwise perceived. Uerhavn’s fishermen agreed that state regulation of the 
sjarks was unnecessary5, but they nonetheless enforced -- with some exceptions -- the 
                                                 
5 Uerhavn's fishermen thought that the fishing effort of the small vessels was sufficiently limited by the weather. The 
fishermen on the small as well as on the big vessels agreed that regulation of the small boats did more harm than 
good, but that regulation of the larger vessels was absolutely necessary. This can be seen as a conflict between 
science and fishermen's knowledge. Uerhavn's fishermen believed that the scientists grossly overestimated the size of 
the cod stocks for instance, but that the activities of the vessels under 13 meters had only limited effect on the stock. 
The fishermen were generally sceptic towards current scientific knowledge, and did not regard it as superior to their 
own. However, Uerhavn's fishermen, including those in small boats, felt morally obliged to obey fisheries law, 
regardless of whether they agreed with it. In other words, the law had independent moral force among these 
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obligation to comply. The following quotes may serve as illustrations of Uerhavn's 
fishermen's morality.  
The fisherman quoted below ("Isak") refers a rumour to me. 
 
I’m afraid he’s fishing a little bit illegally that fellow… There is some talk about it, you know, that 
someone fishes illegally and that. (“Isak” -- Uerhavn fisherman). 
 
When I interviewed "Vegard", I attempted to draw his attention towards 
deterrence. 
 
Author: When you try to stick to the regulations, what is your main reason for doing so? Is it the 
control service6? 
“Vegard” (Uerhavn fisherman): Well, it’s because it’s the law. One would rather keep to the law.  
 
Law-abidingness is an important part of the Norwegian idea of the “good 
citizen”. Illegal fishing practices may thus conflict with Uerhavn fishermen’s image 
of self.7 Rhetoric under an illegal protest fishery connected with restrictions on 
driftnet fishing for salmon in this area in the 1970s emphasised this moral meaning of 
law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
fishermen. Several authors have addressed the relationship between science and fishermen's knowledge (Felt 1994; 
Finlayson 1994; Thorlindsson 1994). 
6 The “control service” is a label used for the enforcement authorities in Norwegian fisheries management. The 
“control service” is a unit under the Ministry of Fisheries responsible for quality control and enforcement of fish 
harvesting regulations. 
7 For a theoretical elaboration on normative behaviour and identity, see Hogg & Abrams 1988: 172-175. 
 13 
We are solid Labour Party people8. We are not notorious lawbreakers. We are fighting for our 
daily bread. The government is facing its own in this case and ought to keep that in mind. 
(Fisherman quoted by Knudsen 1979: 101, my translation). 
 
The obligation to obey the law was accompanied by a general demand that one 
follows the same rules as one’s colleagues do, and particularly rules which regulate 
competition. This will be referred to as the norm of loyalty. In many situations it 
works as a norm against free riding. Informal sanctions connected with a broken rule 
were reinforced if the offence was perceived as having been made in order to obtain 
special advantages compared to others. Albeit this norm did not concern the moral 
authority of the law as such, it generally increased the chance that the law was 
complied with. 
The situation described by "Vidar", is an example of how the informally enforced 
moral norm of loyalty ensures compliance when formal surveillance poses no threat.  
 
“Vidar” (Uerhavn purse seine fisherman): Because the share of small fish was higher than allowed, 
the boats from here had to go up north to fish saithe...We got an offer from a buyer to go 
out and fish undersized saithe. We said that we can’t because of the surveillance. They 
said there was no danger, as they knew where the control service was, so we could just go 
out and fish. But that is something you just don’t do to your comrades. When the others 
have gone up north to fish, and they know you’re lying down here fishing undersized 
saithe. You don’t do it. 
Author: Would it have given you a bad reputation? 
                                                 
8 The Labour Party has been the largest and dominant party in Norwegian politics since World War II. It has been in 
government most of the time since 1945 and was so also during the drift net conflict of 1977. Declaring that one is a 
“solid Labour Party” person in this context implies not only that one votes for the governing party but also that one 
is loyal to the Norwegian political order and basic values of government. It is also worth noting that Norwegian 
fishermen, particularly in northern Norway, historically have had strong links to the Labour Party (Sagdahl 1982: 31-
32).  
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“Vidar”: Yes, absolutely. 
 
The moral obligation to obey the law and the norm of loyalty explain why 
violations of fisheries regulations were met with gossip and consequent social 
degradation, but they do not explain why illegal actions sometimes could be left 
unsanctioned. However, there was a third basic moral norm, which potentially came 
into conflict with the other two. It was generally agreed among Uerhavn’s fishermen 
that a fisherman had a moral right to secure for himself an income good enough to 
stay in the business and to make a reasonable living of it. This will be referred to as 
the right to secure a satisfactory life. I have chosen to use the term “satisfactory life” 
instead of “satisfactory outcome”, as this perceived right also includes a social 
dimension. The importance and scope of this right cannot be properly understood 
unless one keeps the multi-dimensional meanings of fishing in mind. Losing a job as 
a fisherman means losing an identity and a way of life as well as an income. 
Moreover, the economic viability of fishing is linked to the continued existence of the 
community as such. This moral right implies that two fishermen who break the same 
law could be judged differently according to their different situations.  
Quite a few Uerhavn vessels had already had good seasons at the time of the 
saithe closure. Abstaining from fishing for a certain period implied no economic 
threat to them. These vessels were clearly expected to stay ashore, and they did. 
Some fishermen, however, were quite severely affected by the closure, and it was 
generally agreed that they depended on a continued fishery. A few, although not all, 
of these fishermen continued fishing, and these were not objects of backbiting or 
gossip in an outright negative sense. However, their practice was not seen as 
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unproblematic. It was the source of ambivalence, discussion and some disagreement 
in the community. Several fishermen expressed a certain discomfort about this illegal 
practice, but only one of them -- “Karl” -- openly criticised those who continued 
fishing. He referred to the obligation to obey the law as well as the norm of loyalty in 
his criticism. However, as it was mostly agreed that these fishermen were in a special 
situation, the norm of loyalty was seldom brought up in the discussions on these 
particular cases. It was the fact that someone fished illegally in order to resolve a 
difficult situation that was met with unease, albeit also with understanding. The right 
to secure a satisfactory life did thus not define instances where the obligation to obey 
the law was put out of force, but it created an area of moral doubt -- a moral grey 
zone -- in which violations were not met with efficient informal sanctions. 
 
Those who fish saithe around here have been denied to work. I’m talking about human rights…For 
saithe now, they have a right to 25% by-catch, but then there’s 60-70% in the nets. If they want to 
survive, they just have to deliver it. Have the slip falsified. And they’re not blamed for it…But you 
know, we are a profession too. It’s too bad you should have to be a scoundrel all the time. (“Lars” 
-- Uerhavn fisherman). 
 
There’s a boat here that delivers saithe as [different species than the one actually landed] to [a fish 
buyer]. No one looks askance at that. The boys say that when the regulations don't allow small 
boats to survive, they just have to make such arrangements. (“Vidar” -- Uerhavn fisherman). 
 
“Stein” had had a very poor season and it was generally agreed that he was 
among those who were the most severely hit by the closure. He ceased fishing when 
the closure was announced, but he often expressed doubts about whether to resume 
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fishing. In the quote below, he attempts to resolve the moral conflict by classifying an 
illegal practice as being legal in a deeper sense in his case. However, he did not 
resume fishing as long as the closure was in force. The reference to his own feelings 
also indicates that breaking the law conflicts with his image of self.  
 
I must say that such as now, if I have some by-catch falsified on my slip, I wouldn’t feel like a 
law-breaker. If I had broken lots of rules all the time, I would feel that way, but not if I have some 
catch falsified. It would be like self-defence9 in a way. (“Stein” -- Uerhavn fisherman). 
 
But if there is someone who’s had a very good season and then starts getting his slips falsified, 
then there’s talk about it. “He doesn’t need to do that, he’s been doing so well earlier this year”, 
they say then. (“Stein”). 
 
As regards theoretical models of the agent, the data were clear that illegal acts 
which related to professional fishing most often were economically motivated. 
Personal utility and cost-benefit calculation no doubt played their parts. However, 
the moral system described above significantly disturbed the predictive power of the 
utilitarian rational choice model. The informal system of social control largely 
dissolved the connection between expected net gain and the likelihood that an illegal 
act was committed. Illegal fishing for the purpose of maximising profit was met with 
severe social degradation and potentially also exclusion. Only situations defined as 
instances of economic force majeure allowed for illegal practices. My data suggest that 
fear of social degradation or exclusion from the collectivity was usually enough to 
prevent opportunistic, utility-maximising action beyond the law. A fisherman could 
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break a law with little social risk provided that he did it in order to ensure a 
satisfactory, as distinct from a maximum, outcome. The pursuit of economic goals was 
in other words subjected to efficient moral restraints. 
 
Strategic Action and the Grey Zone 
The fact that an act takes community norms into consideration does not exclude 
the very same act from being strategic, self-interested and goal oriented. Pursuing 
personal economic aims while conforming to collective moral standards may imply 
that the actor adapts to the collectivity’s expectations while he also attempts to 
influence these expectations according to his own needs. 
The moral grey zone created a certain elbow-room for fishermen who had an 
incentive to break the law. If a fisherman intended to violate a fisheries regulation, it 
was important that his colleagues defined his situation as covered by the right to 
secure a satisfactory life. Whether or not a situation was covered by this right was 
seldom self-evident. It somehow needed to be negotiated. The fisherman was then 
faced with a dilemma as regards openness about his intentions. Secrecy might be the 
safest strategy in terms of the risk of being reported, but it was risky in terms of 
colleagues’ moral judgement. However, in situations clearly not covered by the right 
to secure a satisfactory life, secrecy was mandatory.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
9 He uses the Norwegian expression nødverge which is a legal term which describes a situation where an individual can 
legally commit acts that otherwise would have been illegal in order to defend himself. 
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“Tor” (Uerhavn fisherman): The cod quotas were so small those first few years.10 We fished a lot 
more. We delivered double quotas some years, you know...We had the slip falsified by the 
buyer, you know. We could deliver it as for instance [different species than the one actually 
landed]. It had approximately the same price as cod...We could spread it throughout the year. 
The buyer profited, you know. Then they took 50 øre11 per kilo for the falsification. 
Author: Did you talk openly about this to people around here? 
“Tor”: No. One has to be a little careful with that. 
Author: Because of the control service? 
“Tor”: Well, because of the control service too, as far as that goes, but it creates rumours among 
people, you know… [T]here were a few hints. People wondered if we weren’t finished with 
our quota soon. We fished for almost [a large amount of money] some years, you know. 
 
By contrast, if a fisherman felt that he had a reasonably good case in the moral 
sense, he would be more likely to choose the strategy of openness. If it could be 
justified that he was in a difficult situation, a strategy of openness about the intention 
to violate a regulation in the near future would have several advantages. First, this 
strategy allowed the fisherman to influence the collectivity’s moral classification of 
his situation and to make allies.  
 
If you break a rule because it creates big problems for you, no one will look askance at you… You 
talk to others…You collect support from the others, you know. (“Stein” -- Uerhavn fisherman). 
 
Secondly, it allowed him to feel out the situation in advance of the violation and 
thus avoid acting contrary to collective moral expectations. Thirdly, openness 
implied the fisherman’s confidence that his plans were morally acceptable, which as 
                                                 
10 This fisherman refers to the period around 1990. The cod quotas were small, but the accessibility of fish as well as 
the fish prices were good in those years 
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such served as an argument in the public negotiations. Finally, openly taking part in 
the discussions reduced the chance of social exclusion, as the collective moral 
judgement was less likely to take place behind his back. The conversation between 
“Leif” and “Peter” below can be seen as an example of how a fisherman makes sure 
that his situation is classified as an instance of economic force majeur, and also collects 
support from other community members. 
 
“Leif” (Uerhavn fisherman): Now the saithe fishery is closed again... now that we’ve had two 
weeks of bad weather. Nothing for us to do on the water… The weather was bad in January, 
February, March and for two weeks now.  
“Peter” (Uerhavn resident, former fisherman): The small ones are being regulated away from the 
coast. 
“Leif”: Yes, we’re being regulated away. Well, I’m going fishing anyway. I’ll take the fine, with a 
clear conscience… I mean deliver, and have the slip falsified. I’m doing it as long as it’s 
possible. 
“Peter”: …Yes, just go along and do that.... Cheat and find your way around it. 
“Leif”: ...I’m behind this year, you know. Didn’t earn a krone for three months this summer. I need 
more, to make ends meet. It’s true. 
“Peter”: ...Remove the ten or twelve sjarks that lie here, and you have removed the entire 
community. 
 
The moral ambiguity of the grey zone implied that grey zone activities were 
objects of unease and negotiation. The extent of public negotiation as such also 
indicates the problematic nature of this issue. In the moral grey zone one might risk 
being met with moral blame, but this blame was not likely to gain widespread 
support. Moreover, it could trigger counter-sanctions. Such protection of the moral 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 50 øre is 0,5 Norwegian kroner. 
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elbow-room of the grey zone may reflect sincere moral conviction but also 
individual, strategic concerns. Prior to the conversation quoted below, I had heard 
“Otto” and another fisherman, both of whom were severely affected by the closure 
and one of whom had chosen to stay ashore, speak rather depreciatory of “Karl” 
who, as mentioned earlier, was the only one who openly criticised those who 
continued fishing. 
 
Author: What was it with [“Karl”]? 
“Otto” (Uerhavn fisherman): Oh, [“Karl”] was out with his claptrap yesterday. He was on the radio 
preaching about [some boats] fishing illegally, and that they should stay ashore. Then he said 
that their gear was in the way of the others. He can be rather crass [“Karl”], but I don’t know 
how seriously he meant it. 
Author: Did others support him? 
“Otto”: No, someone came in and asked him to have a rusk. 
Author: What does “have a rusk” mean? 
“Otto”: Well, that is choking up the talking hole. 
 
It can also be argued that the moral grey zone, as well as the protection of it, 
reflects rationality at a collective level. This topic will be addressed in the next 
section. 
The Community as an Enforcement System 
Despite their perceived obligation to obey the law, Uerhavn’s fishermen regard 
the state’s enforcement as rigid and as bearing the imprint of literalism. This conflict 
follows from the fact that while the state enforces the law, the community enforces 
the moral obligation to obey it. Hence, there is potential conflict between the 
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differing principles of legal and moral judgement. First, an unintended violation of the 
law is still a violation of the law, but it cannot be classified as a moral offence. 
Secondly, while fisheries regulations usually make up a clear and consistent set of 
rules which relevance can be clearly determined in each situation, the moral 
obligation to obey these regulations may be accompanied with an indefinite number 
of other moral norms which may or may not conflict with such an obligation. The 
moral grey zone is an example where other moral norms conflict with the obligation 
to obey the law. Thirdly, the legal system defines and delimits the factors taken into 
consideration when judging whether an act is legal or illegal. These factors may more 
or less correspond to the moral standards of civil society. Moral judgement, by 
contrast, may take an indefinite number of specific factors into consideration and 
thus often emerges as comparatively holistic. The moral judgement of an act may 
thus conflict with the legal one, even when there is a moral obligation to obey the 
law. 
Compared to the state’s enforcement, the community thus emerges as a flexible, 
knowledge-intensive and knowledge-sensitive enforcement system. The economic 
and social well-being of individual fishermen as well as the future of the community 
as such are appreciated moral values – they are seen as being associated with rights. 
The community as an enforcement system thus adapts to the social consequences of 
its own activities. The right to secure a satisfactory life can be regarded as a moral 
buffer against the obligation to obey the law, as the rigid and universal nature of the 
law has a potential of threatening the continued existence of the community. As an 
enforcement system, the fishing community thus avoids undermining its own 
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existence. In this respect, the informal enforcement system emerges as collectively-
rational. 
However, the data suggest that the relationship between formal and informal 
enforcement also has symbiotic features. In the Uerhavn area there were certain local 
regulations which had never been enforced by Norwegian authorities. These were 
regarded as paper regulations, and violations of these were not met with informal 
sanctions. The informal enforcement system was only concerned with regulations 
that were subjected to some degree of formal enforcement. The level of formal 
enforcement was often too low to be particularly deterrent. However, the mere fact 
that some degree of formal enforcement was in place seemed to have symbolic 
significance, as it confirmed the genuineness of the law. A fairly modest level of 
formal enforcement thus kept the informal enforcement system at work. In terms of 
compliance, there were thus significant differences between regulations subjected to 
modest levels of formal enforcement and regulations not enforced at all. If the state 
fails to confirm the law's genuineness through formal enforcement, citizens will 
experience the moral obligation to obey the law as irrelevant, and the informal 
enforcement mechanisms will consequently be put out of action.  
 
Conclusions 
Uerhavn can be seen as a case of how state regulations are transformed into civil 
society morals. A general moral obligation to obey the law induces moral meaning 
into specific laws and thus provides them with regulatory force regardless of how 
their actual contents are perceived. When civil society has conveyed general moral 
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authority to the law in this manner, we may refer to the law as legitimate12. In other 
words, the legitimacy of law refers to the specific moral weight of the law. Law is 
regarded as legitimate when it is experienced as morally binding due to the fact that it 
is law. Legitimacy of law thus implies a general, morally based subordination to the 
state. Without the legitimacy of law, the state would depend on ad hoc moral 
justification of each and every law in each and every situation in order to govern 
with some degree of normative support. Borrowing moral authority from civil 
society in such an ad hoc manner is costly. Moral support reduces the costs of 
enforcement, and the legitimacy of law reduces the costs of moral validation.  
However, the Uerhavn case also illustrates that the legitimacy of law does not 
imply that laws are automatically obeyed regardless of their content. When law is 
transformed into morality, it merely becomes part of the complex and wide-ranging 
moral system of civil society. The law may thus be overruled by moral requirements 
which are perceived as more fundamental than the obligation to obey the law 
whenever the contents of specific laws conflict with certain moral norms of civil 
society.13  
As the informal enforcement of the law follows the principles of moral rather 
than legal judgement, a violation of legitimate law may be left unsanctioned when 
legitimate law conflicts with other moral values and thus renders moral judgement 
difficult. Civil society will also tend to excuse unintended violations of the law to a 
greater extent than the legal system. 
                                                 
12 This would imply an empiricist concept of legitimacy in the Weberian tradition (Weber 1978). 
13 Civil society may naturally also define particular situations or domains in which law has no moral force whatsoever, 
i.e. delimit the legitimacy of law. 
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As regards the more general theories of action, the utilitarian rational choice 
model is insufficient, albeit not altogether irrelevant, in order to explain compliance 
and non-compliance among Uerhavn’s fishermen. The models that until recently 
have dominated the thinking on compliance in fisheries have hence had limited 
explanatory power also in this particular case. The acts and rationales of Uerhavn’s 
fishermen are significantly more in line with the patterns described in the general 
survey research on compliance with the law. Social norms and social control partly 
dissolve the connection between expected benefit and the likelihood of infractions in 
Uerhavn. On the other hand, we have seen that actors may pay regard to and take 
advantage of moral norms in a strategic and goal-oriented manner. The model of the 
braindead conformist is in other words as insufficient as the model of the atomistic, 
utility-maximising opportunist. Softer versions of rational choice theory, such as 
Boudon’s Cognitivist Model, can no doubt take us part of the way. However, 
underlying Uerhavn fishermen’s strategic adaptions and moral thoughtfulness is a 
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